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From the Editors

Priya Kurian and Gauri Nandedkar, University of Waikato

It’s been a momentous year for feminist and gender politics both globally and in Aotearoa New Zealand. It’s a year that began with the worldwide Women’s March on 21 January, involving an estimated 5 million women, which drew attention to not only women’s rights as human rights, but also to core ideas of race and gender justice, social inclusion, and protection of the environment. Then fast forward to 5 October when the Harvey Weinstein scandal broke in the New York Times with dozens of Hollywood stars, including Rose McGowan, Ashley Judd, Angelina Jolie and Gwyneth Paltrow, reporting that they had faced sexual assault, rape, and harassment from film producer Weinstein. In the weeks that followed, millions of women around the world responded to a #MeToo campaign, demonstrating the scale of the issue of sexual assault and harassment.

Bookended by these two events, 2017 has also witnessed electrifying – and devastating – moments of gender, race/ethnicity and class politics in Aotearoa New Zealand. The year culminated with the election as prime minister of the brilliantly articulate Jacinda Ardern, who has brought compassion and climate change into the political mainstream. The election also brought other younger women, such as Kiritapu Allan, Golriz Ghahraman, Willow-Jean Prime, and Chlöe Swarbrick, into parliament, all of whom have helped galvanise youth to connect with politics in ways not seen in recent years.

But, it is also the year when the former co-leader of the Green Party, Metiria Turei – a Māori woman and once a single mother – faced public and media vilification for having received higher welfare benefits than she was legally entitled to and enrolling in a wrong electorate to vote in her youth. Yet, former prime ministers John Key and Bill English emerged unscathed from their own ‘errors of judgement’, whether these were instances of ‘ponytailgate’ or the legally acceptable but morally questionable decisions to receive payments from the state on housing.

Even closer to home, in academic spaces in Aotearoa, several women have borne the brunt of challenging work environments with informal reports from across the country of women staff members facing workplace bullying or being forced into redundancies and resignations. It is now clearer than ever that the presence of feminists notwithstanding, Academia is not a feminist space. The question of how we create and sustain networks of solidarity in the face of attempts at a corporatised colonisation of Universities remains ever more relevant.

We believe Women Talking Politics continues to offer a vital space for women’s voices in the Political Science discipline in Aotearoa. This year’s issue once again offers critical feminist scholarly engagement with a range of diverse topics, spanning the local to the global. Curtin, the outgoing president of the NZPSA, reflects on the significance of women’s political representation evident in this year’s national election in New Zealand and the hopes for achieving substantive gender equality. Moderating that message of hope is a critical reflection from Rahman, a former candidate in both national and local elections and a prominent feminist activist with local and national women’s organisations, on the absence of diversity during the national election. She argues that ethnic representation as currently practised by most political parties is meaningless, and points to the vital need for the amplification and engagement of ethnic voices in public discourse. Also on elections, but at the local level, is a piece by Drage, who sees the cost of standing for election, increased competition for powerful positions and higher workloads as part of the explanation for why the percentage of women elected to local authorities has remained static. Rogers-Mott discusses the failure of a range of policies to address income poverty and material hardship that leads to increasing levels of child poverty in New Zealand. Venturing further afield, Bogado examines the issue of sex-trafficking, in the context of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (the Palermo Protocol). She argues that the criminalisation of the demand for prostitution – a policy measure adopted by many countries – is unlikely to succeed given its failure to address structural causes such as a patriarchal culture. Jolly grapples with the complexities
of gender-based violence and the devastating effects on women in areas of conflict. Van Noort deploys a three-step narrativist framework of analysis to examine the narrative components of the BRICS group [Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa]. Finally, Devere and Standish explore the position of women in the discipline of Peace and Conflict Studies, tracing the evolution of the field of study, the challenges of gender inequality that women face, and the synergies with women in Political Science.

This year’s reflections and research briefs offer an exciting overview of work being undertaken by women political scientists. Snyder thoughtfully considers the efficacy of non-violence in a post-truth era, while Tawhai reflects on her attendance at the 8th University Scholars Leadership Symposium (USLS) run by the United Nations in Bangkok on the theme of “building life, giving hope”. An overview of their current work is offered by MacArthur and Berka on local ownership of energy assets in New Zealand; and by Bebell on Russian foreign policy. We also feature some of the recent publications by women political scientists, namely, Spencer’s *Toleration in Comparative Perspective*; Rupar’s *Themes and Critical Debates in Contemporary Journalism*; and Kurian’s (with Bhavnani, Foran and Munshi) *Feminist Futures: Reimagining Women, Culture and Development (2nd edition)*.

We are pleased to continue to feature work by undergraduate and postgraduate students in political science, including book and film reviews, reflections and creative writing. Townshend reviews the US Television mini-series *The Handmaid’s Tale*; Kahan reviews a recent film, *20th Century Women*; and Nevin contributes a poem *Vote, Vote Against the Buying of the Fight*. These pieces, along with the longer articles, reflections and research briefs, give us a glimpse into the range and richness of issues that animate and engage women in political science in Aotearoa.

As the outgoing co-editors, we express our deepest thanks to all those who have contributed to this edition of *Women Talking Politics*. In particular, we would like to extend our thanks to those individuals who so graciously accepted the invitation to review articles for us – Bethan Greener, Janine Hayward, Julie MacArthur, Adele Norris, Rachel Simon-Kumar, Kathy Smits, Greta Snyder, Lena Tan, and Arezou Zalipour. Our thanks goes out to all the contributors – thank you for your patience in responding to feedback and tight deadlines, and helping create this issue of *Women Talking Politics*. 
This is my final contribution to *Women Talking Politics* as President of NZPSA. And, in parting, it is exciting to be able to once again reflect on the success of women in electoral politics in New Zealand, a subject dear to my heart as a feminist political scientist.

Jacinda Ardern’s rise to the leadership, her stunningly successful election campaign and the return of a Labour-led government surprised many people, both in New Zealand and internationally. Indeed, there are a number of political commentators still struggling to come to terms with the result. We have women heading our three branches of government as Prime Minister, Chief Justice and Governor General, a sight not seen since 2006. While the representation of women as ministers inside cabinet has not increased, we have witnessed an increased number of Māori ministers, and Nanaia Mahuta becomes the first female Minister of Māori Affairs. The Minister for Women is Greens MP Julie Anne Genter, who sits outside cabinet, but she is a “full-time feminist” committed to closing the gender pay gap (Kirk, 2017). Labour’s caucus comprises 46 per cent women, and six of the eight Green MPs are women. The success of these two parties is the reason why we have achieved 38.3 per cent women in parliament, a new high point. The parties on the right have been slower to increase the proportion of women in their caucuses and, until they do, it will be difficult for New Zealand to reach 40 per cent women in parliament. Nevertheless, the renewed presence of women in political leadership may begin a process of ‘normalisation’ with the potential effect being an erosion of the sharp demarcation of gender boundaries that was once commonplace.

In a recent article for Newsroom (Curtin 2017), I argued that there continues to be some resistance to women’s claims for increased descriptive representation in politics. The claim is viewed by some as a distraction from the need to promote the material needs of voters and substantive policy issues. This is an unfortunate turn, because to treat identity and materiality as an either-or or a zero sum game is problematic and appears to assume that the working class is a homogenous group.

Irrespective of how we measure class, large numbers of women and Māori are labourers, call centre operators, carers and manual workers (Curtin, 2017, citing Fahy, Lee and Milne, 2017). We know that women’s experience as workers is often materially different from men’s; women earn less, they are more likely to take breaks to care for family, and work part time, and they end their time as labour market participants with fewer assets and less in their superfund. This is why gender mainstreaming (Europe), gender-based analysis plus (Canada) and gender budgeting (OECD) initiatives are seen as important steps in helping to achieve substantive gender equality.

Feminist scholars argue that the presence of women matters to the substantive “interests” of women as voters. “Interests” are varied, fluid, influenced by intersectional identities, and created through a process of articulation. Anne Phillips (1998) says this strengthens the case for increasing the number of women. Phillips also notes that women’s experiences are sufficiently different to men’s to warrant representation, particularly given that, historically, they have not been addressed adequately in a politics dominated by men.

Perhaps New Zealand women voters know this. New Zealand Election Study (NZES) data reveal that although women were more likely than men to vote National prior to the 1980s, from 1993 a different gender gap emerges, this time in the reverse direction with women more likely to support Labour than National. Women were consistently more predisposed to ‘like’ Helen Clark compared to their male counterparts and while Labour did not win in 2008, Clark’s likeability rating amongst respondents of both sexes actually increased on the 2005 rating. When some women voters returned to National in 2008, closing the gender gap, Anne Else (2009) argued it was in part a result of John Key making a conscious effort to undermine Brash’s ‘bloke-ish’ positions. However, in 2014, the NZES showed women’s support for National as having dropped by around 10 points, to levels not seen since 2005 (Vowles, Coffe and Curtin, 2017).
We do not yet know what happened to the gender gap in the 2017 election and whether women voters mattered to the outcome. However, as I have noted elsewhere, we do know that the questions Jacinda Ardern adeptly answered about her motherhood plans, and the reaction from many about the nature of these questions, indicates a simmering discontent amongst women who are tired of having to wait for male attitudes to catch up with the reality of women’s lives (Curtin, 2017). With so many women on all sides of the House of Representatives, and in the Executive, perhaps that time has come.

References


Meaningful Representation: Where is the Ethnic Minority Voice in New Zealand Politics?

Anjum Rahman, Former candidate for central and local government

The arrival of MMP in 1996 heralded an important change in New Zealand politics. The First-Past-the-Post system led parties to select “safe” candidates who would appeal to the largest demographic. While there were some electorates and safe seats that allowed for minority representation, including South Auckland electorates, it remained very difficult for minority candidates to be selected by major parties, and then elected to government. The greatest level of diversity came through the Māori seats, without which it would have been very difficult for Māori to get representation in central government. That this is the case can be confirmed through lack of representation in local government, though highly qualified Māori candidates put themselves forward in many centres.

With the list process, some parties saw a strong increase in the number of women MPs, bringing the total number from 21 in 1993 to 35 in 1996. However, it took longer for an increase in ethnic minority representation. Pansy Wong was the first into Parliament, on the National Party list in 1996. Ashraf Choudhary entered Parliament on the Labour Party list in 2002. Kenneth Wang came through on the ACT Party list in 2004, after another MP was expelled. It was not until 2008 that the number of Asian MPs rose to 5, but then dropped back to 4 in subsequent elections.

As a percentage of Parliament, ethnic MPs were 0.83% in 1996, 4.17% in 2008 and 3.31% in 2014. In comparison, Asians were 9.6% of the population in 2006, and 11.4% in 2013. Other ethnic minorities from the Middle East, Africa and Latin America would be in addition to these numbers.

There is also an increase in the number of ethnic candidates choosing to put themselves forward for central government elections for a variety of political parties. Not only do the parties themselves realise the importance of representation from these minority groups to attract votes, but also the communities themselves have increasing aspirations to be part of the decision-making processes of this country. This is a welcome trend, and it is hoped that such aspirations are realised in coming years. While there has been a large jump in Māori and Pasifika MPs, there hasn’t been a corresponding rise for ethnic minority MPs.

What is more concerning, though, is that the voices of ethnic minority candidates have been largely missing from public discourse – not only on issues of importance to ethnic minority communities but also from general issues. They are mostly visible in ethnic media (such as Indian Newslink, Radio Tarana, Chinese TV and others) and on social media, but not in mainstream media. There are several reasons for this.

Primarily, the focus of political campaigns, particularly since 2005, has been on the party leader. In the last decade, this has especially become the case as political parties seek to tightly control election coverage and messages, to reduce potential embarrassment and negative coverage. This limits the ability of other candidates to have more public roles during the campaign. Often it is only the deputy leader and a couple of spokespeople who take on visible roles to announce policy.

The effect has been that Māori, Pasifika and ethnic minority candidates are rarely seen or heard, as few of them hold senior leadership positions. There have been exceptions, such as the deputy leaders of both major parties in the 2017 election. However, it is a worrying aspect of political participation that diverse voices and faces are not visible to the majority of the public, as one of the purposes of representation is to begin to mainstream those who are seen as ‘other’.

There has been a range of issues where it would have been appropriate for ethnic minority candidates and MPs to speak, from immigration to race relations, from housing (especially the attack on particular ethnic minorities buying homes) to education (especially the focus on international students). Yet none of these issues were fronted by ethnic minority candidates or MPs, and, in fact, there were few political commentators or public commentary from ethnic minority communities who brought an alternative perspective to these issues.

This lack of voice and ability to participate in and shape public discourse is hugely disturbing. It means that representation, as presently practised by all political parties, has been largely meaningless and simply a way to appease minority voters. In order to combat this problem, attempts were made to form ethnic minority
parties in 1996 and 2015, but both failed to have any lasting impact in the polls or on public debate.

As ethnic minority communities grow in New Zealand, there will be an increasing push for inclusion that is meaningful and at the highest levels. It is time for political parties, major and minor, to reassess their processes and the way they work, so that ethnic minority representation is not just in name but has a distinct impact at a national level.

1. In this piece, “ethnic minority” is used to denote people who are not of Pakeha, Māori or Pasifika heritage


5. The Ethnic Minority Party was established in 1996, and the New Zealand People’s Party in 2015
An initial glance at the 2016 local election results provides some surprises. The percentage of women elected to New Zealand’s local authorities has remained static at around 30 to 32 per cent for the last 20 years; so the, albeit slight, increase to 38 per cent raised some eyebrows around what has changed. A closer look, however, shows that apart from relatively small increases in women elected to district health boards and some community-based boards1 (boards with limited significant decision-making) there has been minimal change to the number of women elected to mayoral and councillor positions on city, district and regional councils where the big decisions are made. And while it is clear that community boards have often been the first step for women standing for public office, we are still to see an increase at this level being converted into more women being prepared to stand for council positions.

This article looks at women’s participation as candidates and their success at being elected to New Zealand’s local government elections in 2016 and asks why the rate of growth in women’s elected representation has been limited in all but community-based and district health boards.

Women have been elected to local councils for almost 125 years. Elizabeth Yates was elected mayor of Onehunga borough on 29 November 1893, the day after women had voted for the first time in parliamentary elections (Devalient, 1996). But it wasn’t until the 1980s that the numbers of women started to rise markedly due mainly to the increased efforts of the Women’s Electoral Lobby which encouraged women to stand as candidates and distributed information for women on how to take part in local government (Women’s Electoral Lobby, 1977; 1980; Preddy, 2003). It was almost the end of the 20th century when 30 per cent (the UN’s defined critical mass, at the time) was reached.

However, a great deal has changed in the local government environment since then. Such changes have seen local authorities restructured, resulting in fewer councils and even fewer elected positions so that councillor roles have become fulltime in busy urban centres and there is greater competition for these positions particularly on the larger urban-based councils. Legislation around the turn of the century (the Local Government Act 2002 and the Resource Management Act 1991) saw significant changes to the way local government operated through more corporate style councils with an increased role in the overall economic, social, cultural and environmental development of their communities. At the same time, a new Local Electoral Act 2001 emphasised equality of opportunity to stand for local elections and greater diversity of representation through a local choice of electoral systems (FPP or STV2) and a provision for Māori wards. Further amalgamations occurred in 2010 when the new Auckland unitary council was formed, with a governing council and 21 local boards. On top of this, efforts to open up electoral choice through STV and Māori wards has led to little change given the reluctance of councils and, in some cases, communities to take up these options (Bargh, 2016; Hayward, 2016).

It is of note that with the mandating of STV for district health board elections (an area of decision-making historically seen as ‘acceptable’ for women) in the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, the 2016 election results show women gained 53 percent of seats on these boards (Department of Internal Affairs, 2016). Similarly, a proportional electoral system introduced in New Zealand in 1996 for our general elections led to an immediate increase in the number of women elected and increased diversity across parliament. Hayward (2014) suggests that while it will take time for local government candidates and voters to see the potential benefits of a proportional representation election, “there has been some change in the gender, ethnicity and age of some members elected by STV” (Hayward, 2014, p. 23).

The following two tables provide data on the proportion of women elected over the last 10 local elections and a breakdown of the number of women elected in the 2016 local government election. Overall, women stood for 35 per cent of all candidate positions in 2016 and were elected to 38 per cent of positions available. More specifically, women now make up one third (34
per cent) of all city and district councils and 24 per cent of regional councils, the latter still being made up predominantly of farmers and retired district and city mayors (McNeill, 2016). While we still have regional councils with all men (such as the West Coast regional council), this is not as common as in the past. Thirteen women mayors were elected to city and district council (21 per cent) in 2016 (the percentage of women mayors peaked at 25 per cent in 1998).

The greatest increase in women standing as candidates and being elected has been in Auckland at the local board level. Whilst the proportion of women being elected at the community level across New Zealand was 31 per cent in 2001, 15 years later (with the inclusion of local board elections) this percentage has risen to 39 per cent. In 2010 at the first election of the new Auckland unitary council, women were elected to 39 per cent of seats on Auckland’s new local boards. This percentage increased to 42 per cent of seats in 2013 and 51 per cent of seats in 2016.¹

The second table shows women candidates have a greater chance of being elected than male candidates. The main obstacle to women’s success is the fact that they don’t stand for election. Citing the Auckland local board data again, women made up 37 per cent of candidates standing for a local board in 2013 and were elected to 42 per cent of seats. In 2016, they were 42 per cent of all local board candidates and gained 51 per cent of these seats. If more women stood for election, it is clear that the number of women elected would increase.

So why don’t more women stand for local council seats? Surely we have moved on from what Webster and McGregor (2017) identify as a backlash against women in all the top jobs at the beginning of the 21st century when New Zealand had a woman Prime Minister, Governor General and Chief Justice (Webster and McGregor, 2017). Maybe it is more of a false perception that women are already there in sufficient numbers.

Possibly it is related more to the costs of standing for election particularly in the bigger local authorities where participation is expensive in terms of time and money. Media coverage of election campaigns that identifies candidates spending more than $100,000 excludes most women from these campaigns. And historically there has been little overt political party involvement in local government to help fund these campaigns.

It is clear that local government reforms have had an impact here. Fewer council seats, increased competition for more powerful positions and higher workloads all affect the decision to stand. Many women, already juggling families and careers, are deterred from standing by the time and resources needed to invest in an elected position that is more than full-time and that exists in a more competitive political environment.

So why does it matter that sufficient numbers of women are elected to our local councils? It matters because local government is big business in New Zealand. Our local councils have a fundamental role in the provision of local infrastructure and services, in managing our natural resources and community well-being and in providing leadership for our communities. It is essential that women’s interests are represented when decisions are being made about what services are provided in our communities and how they are provided, that women are part of the decision-making process to ensure a variety of perspectives are heard and that elected bodies look like the people they represent – all signs of a healthy and legitimate democracy.

1. Community-based boards are defined here as local boards in the Auckland unitary authority area and community boards in some district and city councils
2. The First Past the Post electoral system or the more proportional Single Transferable Vote
3. Based on data collated and discussed in K. Webster and E. Fa’apoi’s ‘Auckland local governance: Closing the representation gap, or not?’, 2015.

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Women’s Electoral Lobby (1980). Here I Stand.
Evidence for the Need of Policy to Better Address Child Income Poverty and Material Hardship in New Zealand

Child poverty is a significant issue in New Zealand, affecting almost 300,000 New Zealand Children as of 2016. However, current policy is insufficient at tackling the issue as seen in the fluctuations of impoverished children from 2006 to 2016 (Duncanson et al., 2016). The White Paper for Vulnerable Children 2012 and the welfare reforms implemented by the National Party in October 2012 and July 2013 do not adequately address the factors that contribute to child income poverty and material hardship such as the low levels of familial income and accessibility to paid employment.

Impoverished children as defined by the New Zealand Child Poverty Action Group are: “children . . . who experience deprivation of the material resources and income that is required for them to develop and thrive, leaving such children unable to enjoy their rights, achieve their full potential and participate as equal members of New Zealand society” (Wynd, 2012). The Child Poverty Monitor created by the University of Otago defines children in income poverty as being in a household that earns under 60 per cent of the median household income for New Zealand (Income Poverty Infographics, 2016). Approximately 295,000 or 28 per cent of New Zealand children are classified by these definitions as being impoverished. This number has increased from the 2008 measure of 237,000 New Zealand children living in poverty. The Child Poverty Monitor states that income poverty affects 1 in 3 children of Pasifika descent, 1 in 3 children of Māori descent, and 1 in 6 children of European or Pakeha descent (Income Poverty Infographics, 2016).

As previously stated, the symptoms of child poverty include a lack of material resources and income. This can result in living in damp and overcrowded housing, having inadequate clothes for the weather conditions over the wetter and colder seasons, and having little access to nutritious food. Poverty also prevents children from accessing required doctor visits as the costs of appointments and medicine is too great. Living in financial hardship prevents children from gaining a basic primary school level education due to lack of available funds to purchase a school uniform and stationery, thus affecting the child’s ability to achieve academically and ability to gain paid employment as an adult. Furthermore, the perpetuation of child poverty has resulted in the government spending on between NZ$ 6-16 billion dollars annually on areas related to child poverty (such as poor education and productivity, health, crime and welfare) (Child poverty costs NZ, 2012).

Whilst the causes of child poverty are diverse and numerous, a significant factor is low familial income. Unemployment, low pay, and insecure employment impede an adult caregiver’s ability to provide for a child. If the money received whether through paid employment or government benefits is not enough to consistently provide for a child, then the child and other family members will often go without basic necessities. This can consequently impact the level of education received, and generate physical ailments and mental health issues (such as neurobehavioural conditions) which hinder success in the labour market in adult life. Such potential lack of employment perpetuates financial hardship and maintains the poverty cycle when more children are born into poverty by parents who have themselves inherited the poverty (Gregg et al., 1999; Gregg, 2007).

The White Paper for Vulnerable Children released by the National Party-led Government in 2012 advocates for a decrease in the amount of welfare paid to parents. This policy assumes that the parent has the ability to work but is neglecting to for the option of easier income. It does not take into account the social norms and structures or lack of adequate education that prevent an impoverished adult from competing in the labour market at an employment level that earns a living wage or above. The White Paper otherwise neglects to address the issue of child income poverty and material hardship, instead using the word ‘poverty’ to describe child neglect. “Many children live in a different sort of poverty – poverty of affection, poverty of protection, poverty of expectation, poverty of educational stimulation, poverty of positive role models” (Bennett, 2012).

The welfare reforms alluded to in the White Paper are the October 2012 Work Obligations reform, and July 2013 Welfare System Changes reform. The October 2012 reform aimed to “encourage and support more people into work” (Ministry of Social Development, 2012) through decreasing the number of people on benefits, and reducing the amount of money given to beneficiaries. The July 2013 reform centred on
“changes involving the types of benefits and obligations beneficiaries must meet” and introduced the Job Seeker Support benefit, the Sole Parent benefit, and the Supported Living Payment, which replaced almost all other “main” benefits (Ministry of Social Development, 2013).

Despite other policies being enacted in conjunction with the above reforms that reduced the amount of tax subtracted from incomes of working families (such as National’s Working for Families Tax credits), the levels of child poverty have persisted. Since the implementation of the October 2012 and July 2013 reforms, the number of children living in poverty has increased from 260,000 in 2013 to 295,000 in 2016 (Asher, n.d). The Child Poverty Action Group has recommended that the Government end discriminatory policy that reduces the amount of money received by beneficiaries through the acknowledgement of the existing challenges facing those who are impoverished (Dale, 2014).

It is evident that the policy strategies implemented to assist impoverished children through the reduction of welfare have not been able to alleviate child poverty. Income poverty and material hardship affect numerous aspects of a child’s life, increases the likelihood of a child being impoverished as an adult, and costs the nation a significant amount of money annually. There is a clear requirement for policy to better address the complexities of this prominent issue in New Zealand society.

References


“We must undergo a radical revolution of values.”
Dr Martin Luther King Jr. (1967)³

Introduction

The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (also known as the Palermo Protocol 2000) provides the first international definition of human trafficking and establishes measures to be adopted by states to fight this form of criminality. These measures can be classified into three different approaches: prevention, protection and prosecution in countries of origin, transit and destination.

Article 9 of the Palermo Protocol establishes measures that governments need to adopt to prevent human trafficking. Some key guidelines towards the elaboration of a prevention strategy include:

1. The need for transnational, inter-agency cooperation;²
2. The implementation of programmes for the alleviation of poverty, underdevelopment and lack of equal opportunity which make victims vulnerable to trafficking;
3. The critical role of education, social and cultural measures to discourage demand.

In implementing these measures and guidelines, many countries such as Australia, Canada, and the United States, as well as regional blocs such as the European Union, have launched transnational programmes to prevent trafficking, which include education and economic development to fight the economic and social vulnerability that predisposes women to victimisation in origin countries (Ross, 2014). These efforts have seen modest success.

Other countries, such as Sweden, Finland, Norway and France, have introduced the criminalisation of demand for sexual services as a way to deter trafficking for sexual exploitation. In this article, I focus on this particular strategy to show that the criminalisation of demand for prostitution fails to prevent trafficking for it does not address the structural causes of trafficking, namely, the persistent patriarchal culture in society that denies women’s freedom and agency and makes trafficking for sexual slavery profitable. I then make the case for a reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Palermo Protocol.

Human Trafficking and Prostitution

Recent feminist perspectives on human trafficking reject the divisions between trafficking for sexual slavery and trafficking for other forms of exploitation, understanding that sexual work is just another form of labour and, as such, trafficking is always for labour exploitation.³ This article focuses on the intersection between human trafficking and prostitution, to present a critique of those approaches that maintain that human trafficking for sexual exploitation can be reduced by criminalising the demand for prostitution.

This critique combines an abolitionist approach, which argues for the abolition of the patriarchal structures that sustain the oppression and exploitation of women incarnated in women’s trafficking, and a women’s agency approach which separates the “processes of transportation under coercion from the sex trade” and defines prostitution as legitimate work (Kempadoo, Sanghera, & Pattanaik, 2012). Consequently, when this paper refers to trafficking for sexual exploitation, it is referring to the process of transportation under coercion and the forcing of women to engage in sexual activities, whereas it sees prostitution as free and consensual sexual trade.

Demand for Enslaved Women as a Socially Determined Factor

In a study to assess if trafficking is demand driven, O’Connell Davidson and Anderson (2003) surveyed hundreds of clients of prostitution in several countries, to determine the motivations that lead them to consume sexual services from both free and enslaved prostitutes. The authors found that the experience of buying sex is highly social and socially conditioned: “For the majority of our [interviewees], the initial decision to buy sex appears to have been […] a public and social matter […] part of a ‘rite of passage’, as well as a ritual to consolidate relationships with male friends” (O’Connell Davidson & Anderson, 2003, p. 17).
When one reads the interviews of clients (Hughes, 2004; Zaitch and Staring, 2009) as they recount their reasons for choosing trafficked, underage or drug-addicted prostitutes, it is natural to feel tempted to label clients as people with “an array of personal and psychological problems and criminal motives behind [their] decision to buy sex acts” (Hughes, 2004, p. 56). But these men usually represent a significant percentage of the male population, who were born and raised in our societies, and the vast majority of them are highly socialised, law-abiding, and integrated into society. As a consequence, their sexual behaviour is greatly influenced by our societies’ notions of women and the limits of women’s freedom and agency. An effective trafficking prevention strategy needs to attack these notions, which are present not only in sex services clients but all across our societies (Nanu, 2010).

**Criminalisation versus Prevention**

When it comes to trafficking prevention, Article 9 of the Palermo Protocol recommends “education, social and cultural measures to discourage demand” (UNGA, 2000). In line with this, the Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights also stresses that “strategies aimed at preventing trafficking should take into account demand as a root cause” (Nanu, 2010). Similarly, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) said that the main challenge to fight trafficking is to reduce demand for services provided by sex slaves (UNODC, 2010) and, in almost identical sense, the Brussels Declaration 2002 said that “the demand for sexual services [...] must continue to be at the forefront of the long-term efforts” (EU, 2002, p. 3).

In implementing these guidelines, many countries have chosen to criminalise the demand for sexual services. Sweden was the first country to enforce legislation which criminalised the purchase of sex as a way to deter demand for prostitution and thus prevent human trafficking based on the “inseparability of prostitution [demand] and trafficking” (Raymond, 2004, p. 326). This initiative was followed by Finland in 2006, Norway in 2009 and, most recently, France in 2016.

Many organisations in Europe have been advocating for the same approach. For instance, the European Women’s Lobby [EWL] (1998) has stated that trafficking of women as well as prostitution are expressions of the persistence of patriarchal structures and ideologies in our societies. Thus, any policy which aims to fight trafficking needs to attack sexual exploitation and demand for prostitution by targeting clients for sexual services (EWL, 1998).

This criminalisation of demand has been rightly accused of implementing a right-wing agenda underpinned by a rejection of prostitution based on a moral opinion (Levy & Jakobsson, 2013). Further to these critiques, the criminalisation of clients and/or prostitutes has failed to effectively prevent trafficking for it targets individuals while leaving intact the patriarchal structures and ideologies of society which sustain women’s exploitation and make trafficking profitable (Van den Anker, 2006). It seems ironic that although the proponents of ‘criminalisation of demand’ recognise that women’s exploitation is the result of the characteristics of our societies, they propose solutions aimed at individuals (i.e. criminalisation of clients for sexual services or criminalisation of sexual services providers).

**An Alternative Preventive Approach Based on Structural Social Change**

Given the social nature of human trafficking and the demand for trafficked women, a sociological reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Palermo Protocol is in order. When the Protocol refers to “cultural and social measures” to deter demand, it should not be interpreted as prescribing the criminalisation of individual clients, but as endorsing the transformation of the persistent patriarchal culture in societies, which sustains demand for trafficked and enslaved prostitutes by maintaining that women can be exploited as merchandise. Following this reinterpretation, governments and NGOs ought to work together to implement a bilateral or multilateral transnational prevention strategy that pursues social and cultural change in society by means of education, research, information, mass media campaigns and programmes for social and economic development. These programmes need to be aimed at society as a whole and not just towards men who are consumers of prostitution, for their behaviour is merely the individual manifestation of a social fact but not the root-cause for trafficking and sexual exploitation.

**Conclusions**

Measures that target either prostitutes or clients as individuals will not produce the social and cultural change which is required to eradicate not only women’s trafficking but all other forms of violence against women.
A sociological reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Palermo Protocol forces states to implement social and cultural measures designed to identify and transform the patriarchal structures present in societies that make women vulnerable to trafficking and normalise women’s exploitation. This needs to be done through transnational cooperation among origin, transit and destinations countries, and by means of education and other cultural and social initiatives aimed at the whole of society and not just individuals or economic minorities.

1. This phrase is an excerpt from Dr Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “Beyond Vietnam” address, given at New York City’s Riverside Church on Tuesday, April 4th, 1967.

2. Ross (2014) says that the Protocol has created a transnational duty to prevent human trafficking and argues that the obligations imposed by the Protocol are stronger and more compelling than those in international human rights treaties.


4. Approximately 10% of the men interviewed in Sweden declared to have paid for sex at least once in their lives, around 37% in Japan and 73% in Thailand (O’Connell Davidson & Anderson, 2003).

5. In explaining the reasons for prostitution demand, Berger (2012) explains that “research identifies that, while some sex buyers may suffer from psychological issues, the majority do not”. Instead, she found “a link between the social constructs of “masculine” identity and sex work that leads men to buy sex when they feel their masculinity is threatened.” (p. 541)

6. “A social fact is any way of acting, whether fixed or not, capable of exerting over the individual an external constraint; which is general over the whole of a given society whilst having an existence of its own, independent of its individual manifestations” (Durkheim, 2013, p. 27)

7. As they are politically independent and not limited by specific timeframes, NGOs and International Law Agencies have an enormous potential in achieving long-lasting social and cultural change. By researching, developing and implementing long-term plans in close cooperation with governments and using public funding, NGOs and International Law Agencies can have a critical role in assisting states to fulfil their obligation of preventing trafficking by means of cultural and social measures, as prescribed by the Palermo Protocol. I intend to further explore and propose social and cultural measures which could be undertaken to achieve this societal change.

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Evidence of Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV) in times of conflict and peace has existed since time immemorial. But understanding what causes such violence, and its frequency, occurrence and variation, has evolved over time. The social norms that prescribe and proscribe SGBV have also undergone radical changes, reflected in the ways in which it has been accepted or condemned at different points in history. The typology of SGBV ranges from biologically-driven and opportunistic to strategic and structural, while its implications for individuals and communities are vast. Equally multifarious are the methods used to prevent, treat and hold perpetrators accountable. Women are impacted differently, and sometimes more adversely, than men during an ethnic/civil/political conflict. They develop unique coping mechanisms and struggle with gender-specific hindrances in transition, including notions of a woman's familial honour, sexual virtue, reproductive capacity and labour in the political economy of war and the sustenance of peace.

In terms of multidimensionality, conflict can no longer be conceived as a quintessentially masculine realm. Its implications and repercussions reach across gender divides and ignore gender binaries to expose our gendered selves (Cohn, 2013). While women often do not consent to or support the manoeuvres of conflict and may be alienated during its design, women have sometimes been known to be active participants in conflict situations as has been documented, for example, in South Africa, Cyprus and Northern Ireland. This sets the stage to explore constructed narratives of victimization, agency and masculinity-femininity, which may offer insights into how the unexpected opportunities and spaces that conflict opens up for women can be used to engender social transformation of structures and consciousness (Meintjes, Pillay, and Turshen, 2002). The key is to connect the dots between gender discrimination and inequality, domestic violence, sexual harassment and assault, forced prostitution, sexual slavery and rapes during peace time with their amplified manifestations during conflict, against a backdrop of patriarchal power and violence.

As seen during and after the dirty wars of Latin America and the civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa, women have struggled to consolidate their gains in terms of liberation, social involvement, de facto leadership, legislative representation and benefit from memory and justice projects. Their losses in the form of destitution, violation, dispossession and privation are more pronounced, even though those are partly the result of a post-war backlash against women's newfound identities as bread-winners and leaders, and an attempt to counter male disenfranchisement and perceived emasculation. Belying this phenomenon is a toxic amalgamation (with intercultural and intracultural variations) of social sanction of violence against women, individual and group antagonisms, power imbalance between genders and the maintenance of hegemonic masculinity at the cost of femininity (see, e.g., Kaufman and Williams, 2010; Jacobs, Jacobson, and Marchbank, 2000). It begs the question of how perceptions of sexual violence impact conceptions of reconciliation, shifts in gender relations and the restructuring/dismantling of patriarchal forces. Combating SGBV through appropriate interventions requires a critical and contextual understanding of social fragmentation, contestations of power and internalized notions of sexuality and gender roles. Ironically, SGBV is both an intensely personal brand of violence as well as a tool of social destruction (Meintjes, Pillay, and Turshen, 2002).

Understanding the gendered endings, beginnings and continuities in the peace-war-peace labyrinth is also key to negotiating women's roles in the big picture of peace processes, political settlements, economic reconstruction, democratic transitions, social reforms, etc. (Cohn, 2013). When extrapolating on the assignment of responsibility and the apportionment of blame, in cases of entrenched interpersonal violence, it has to be recognised that inherited legacies and learned behaviours result in the continuum of SGBV. Women are not exempt from oppressing, stigmatising or ostracising their own based on racial or ethnic hierarchies. While a crime like rape is used to terrorise, humiliate, torture and induce servility, the boundaries between consent and force become blurred when fraternisation and acquiesced subordination for survival are part of the equation. However, SGBV does not begin and end with rape. It encompasses a whole host of traumatic actions, omissions and after-effects. In most cases, bodily integrity and dignity are the first to be compromised, making it difficult to design appropriate and suitable reparative measures (Turshen, 2010).

The concept of sexual violence can be situated within the rubric of ingrained traditional “heterosexual
exchanges” (Gilbert and Webster, 1982, p. 114) and the “quasi-socially sanctioned continuum of male aggression” (Marolla and Scully, 1979, p. 316). This feeds into the debate about episodic and epiphenomenal versus dynamic portrayals of SGBV, as part of a larger landscape of privation. There have been ontological and epistemological shifts in the recognition and treatment of sexual violence as, for example, the change in the trajectory of conceptualising rape from a byproduct to a weapon of war during conflicts. Much of the commentary records the overlap between the female body and the body politic in the diverse enterprise of war. A case in point is the targeted mass rapes during the civil wars in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia (Baaz & Stern, 2013; St. Germain & Dewey, 2012; see also Goldstein, 2009).

There is a push for disrupting universalised and linear narratives of the ‘sexed story’ that do not reflect the complexity of gendered warscapes and the inter-subjectivity of victims, perpetrators, bystanders and their communities. Current meta, post-conflict frameworks, such as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) and Trials, are impoverished in hearing, seeing or making sense of the messiness and discomfort of human engagement and suffering during conflict (Anderlini, 2007; Baaz & Stern, 2013). It is the incomprehension of egregious violence and the attendant silences that undergird the pre-existing conditions that foster SGBV. Contemporary waves of globalization, militarisation, ethno-nationalism, migration, failed states and capitalist economies have only sought to further impugn as well as reproduce and entrench patriarchal structures, thereby perpetuating conditions that are ripe for SGBV. Much of the dialectical rumination on the gendered and ethical machinations of human engagement is concerned with whether sexual violence or its threat is a mere runaway norm/taboo that disregards social thresholds of oppression or serves a higher disciplinary function of maintaining the status quo of gender hierarchies. This also prompts deliberation as to how a society can extend an ethic of care and accountability to victims of such violence (Leatherman, 2012). Given that political violence, instability, discrimination and weak criminal justice systems increase women’s vulnerability to sexual violence, the State has paramount responsibility to reverse these precarious conditions. However, taking the cases of Afghanistan, Haiti, Colombia, Timor Leste, Sierra Leone and Liberia among others, as examples, scholars caution against the “illusion and perversion of protection” a.k.a benevolent sexism, in government responses to SGBV (St. Germain & Dewey, 2014). Also, care has to be taken to desist from dismissing the intersectional nature of such issues by not privileging gender over other forms of marginalisation and exclusion (Afshar, 1996).

**References**


In the 21st century, the pluralisation of state and non-state actors perpetuates the “battle of narratives” to give meaning to the international environment. In this battle, political actors communicate “strategic narratives,” which are “means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the past, present, and future of international politics to shape the behavior of domestic and international actors” (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, & Roselle, 2013, p. 2). One case study useful for a “narrativist” analysis is that of the rising BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa] group as the group’s mission is to foster a fair and more democratic multipolar world order (BRIC, 2009, Article 12) – no easy task when set against a fragmenting world order. Building on the popularity of the investment theme “BRIC,” coined by Jim O’Neill (2001), the four rising powers initiated cooperation in 2009 and, in 2010, included South Africa.

Strategic narratives are instrumental tools for winning the battle in the cognitive domain (Freedman, 2006). Within the “narrative turn” in international relations (Roberts, 2006), empirical studies address amongst others the political communication of military interventions and identity formation (for example, de Graaf, Dimitriu, & Ringsmose, 2015; Kaldor, Martin, & Selchow, 2007). I agree with Hanska’s intervention on strategic narratives in which he indicates the overall need for a “deeper insight into narratology” within this type of research (2015, p. 325). This essay therefore seeks to advance the methodological framework of narrative analysis for the study of strategic narratives with the example of the BRICS case.

In seeking to model a narrativist approach, it is useful to explore the methodological framework for studying strategic narratives (see, e.g., methodology chapter in Forging the World by Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, & Roselle, 2017). With reference to Brent Steele’s work (2010), the authors define four dispositions in the “spectrum of persuasion” for explaining strategic narratives: very thin (rationalist), thin (communicative action), thick (reflexive) and very thick (poststructuralist) (Miskimmon et al., 2013, p. 14). This spectrum categorises the ontological approaches in these types of IR studies; it does not structurally address how narratives bring about persuasion by means of their narrative quality.

The narrativist view I propose assumes a three-step logic to uncover and interpret: (1) the narrative components of the BRICS story, (2) how these events and motives are configured by means of thematic and narrative structures into coherent strategic narratives and plots, and (3) the compliance of the identified strategic narratives with so-called narrative grammar rules (bringing together the ideas of Burke, 1962; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, & Roselle 2013; Dimitriu & de Graaf, 2016; and Oppermann & Spencer, 2016). This three-step approach identifies and explains the formation process of strategic narratives by investigating the threefold mimesis of prefiguration, configuration and refiguration of narratives. The narrativist approach is inspired by literary studies that look at the universality of narrative structures (see Ricoeur, 1981).

The first step draws on Burke’s “dramatism” (1962) for the description of: actors (agent), setting (scene), conflict or action (act), tools (agency), and goal (purpose) (see also Miskimmon et al., 2017, p. 7). It answers the who, when, where, what, how and why components. A balance between these narrative components creates a “ratio,” which when breached causes “trouble” (Bruner, 1991, p.16). In the case of the BRICS, such “trouble” has emerged due to the global economic slowdown, the commodities crash and the multiple political challenges in the respective countries.

The second step studies how the narrative components are constituted in coherent strategic narratives and an overarching plotline, by addressing both form (narrative structures) and content (themes), despite the “troublesome” events. This step identifies how the BRICS group gives meaning to the international environment, to themselves as a collective actor, and to policy discussions in its annual joint communiqués. This narrative angle corresponds to the formation of a system narrative, identity narrative and issue narratives (Miskimmon et al., 2013, p. 7).

The third step interrelates the strategic narratives within a narrative environment of material, symbolic and institutional practices (Somers, 1994, p. 616). This narrative framework restrains the preferred configuration of strategic narratives. To do so effectively, a “narrative grammar” for strong strategic narratives is adopted (Dimitriu & de Graaf, 2016, p. 7). The grammatical rules comprise five indicators: a clear and compelling mission purpose; the legitimisation of the mission purpose in the objective (decision-making) and subjective (norms and
values) sense; projecting promise of success; the absence or presence of counter narratives; and the creation of an effective strategic communication plan. I added Oppermann and Spencer’s notion of “emplotment” to this list, which is the ability “to turn a set of propositions into an intelligible sequence of connected events about which one can form an opinion” (2016, p. 691).

Together, these three steps constitute an advanced narrativist viewpoint applicable to the study of strategic narratives. At first glance, it may be easy to dismiss the coherency and persuasiveness of the BRICS story due to explicit divergences among the five powers (i.e. cultural, political, and socio-economic). Although some might argue that any search for narrative coherency is misplaced as the international order becomes more fragmented (Schweller, 2014), pursuing a narrativist approach might help best analyse how the strategic narratives of the BRICS are shaped and as to why certain contradictions in the group’s strategy exist (for complete analysis, see Van Noort, 2017). This could then explain the delay of the BRICS group to facilitate a fairer and more democratic multipolar world order.

References


Gender Issues in Politics and Peace and Conflict Studies

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We are two women in the only Peace and Conflict Studies Centre in New Zealand, based at Otago University. Our disciplinary backgrounds are in politics and in peace and conflict studies. We are working on a paper about the politics of peace and conflict studies, and we share part of our work here where we examine the role of women in the discipline, and the overlap with the discipline of politics.

Peace and Conflict Studies (PACS) has evolved into an academic and practical discipline of recognizing and transforming violence nonviolently (Barash and Webel 2014). It exists as both a conversation about how, when, with whom and why violence can (and should) be transformed as well as a repertoire of techniques, practices or tools with which to do so. It is an academic field that surrenders deep disciplinary underpinnings in order to function intersectionally and engage with violence transformation from multiple conflict temporalities—violence is intersectional so transforming violence must be intersectional too—as violence transformation can be employed, pre, post and during violent conflict.

PACS, like the study of Politics, covers a broad range of internal strands, approaches, topics and methods. There is a high degree of overlap with aspects of political studies and political science such as international relations, political psychology, political sociology, political philosophy and ethics. PACS also addresses similar topics covered by scholars of politics, including human rights, social justice, diversity, equality, poverty, economic distribution, climate change, communications, indigenous rights, diplomacy, and social movements.

Just as politics emerged as a field of study separate from earlier disciplines, PACS is also closely associated with several different disciplines. Apart from politics, it is linked to other social sciences such as psychology, sociology, geography and anthropology. There are aspects of the discipline that place it within the humanities where it can link to art, drama, history, and theology or religious studies. Aspects of peace and conflict studies concern the medical and physical sciences, the law, education and journalism.

PACS evolved alongside and out of a social movement into an area of academic study, similar to civil rights, the labour movement, feminism, environmentalism and indigenous studies. In that sense it operates both as a theoretical critic and a lens through which to view the world. It also has a strong practice component, aiming to inform peace-making, peacebuilding, conflict resolution and conflict transformation processes with a theoretical underpinning, as well as to incorporate lessons learned in the ‘field’ into new theoretical understandings.

Politics, not surprisingly, developed initially as a very male-centred academic study. As political science was concerned with the study of political power and institutions of government, it was easy to exclude women who were “disproportionately represented among the powerless” (Devere, 1995). Women have made impressive in-roads, and have challenged what constitutes the discipline of politics, published widely, and incorporated feminist analyses. However, there is still a way to go before they achieve equality within the discipline (see, for example, Curtin, 2013; APSA report 2005).

The trajectory for women in the field of peace studies was different to that of women in politics, as PACS emerged from the global peace movement where women were much more visible from the beginning. The connection between the women’s rights movement and the peace movement in the United States can be traced to 1820. Confortini (2013, p. 285) describes the development of women’s peace movements that linked anti-militarism, nonviolence and women’s rights and the “almost seamless connection between their work to end the oppression of women and other categories of people and their efforts against militarism, militarization, and war”. Alonso (1997, p. 83) suggests that “Although peace activists have emphasized the need to end war and eliminate militarism in order to achieve world peace, feminists have always added the claim that militarism and war foster violence against women”.

During the First World War, women activists worked both in single-sex organisations and teamed up with men, such as in the US anti-war organization People’s Council of America for Democracy and Terms of Peace (shortened to the People’s Council of America). This was a coalition of socialists, labour leaders, pacifists, feminists and suffragists (often with overlapping
ideologies) (Alonso 1997, p.84.). Alonso (1997, p.85) argues that “although the ideological links between those were fluid” the activists fell into three distinct categories: female suffragist pacifists, male pacifists, and male and female socialists.

However, the presence of women in the contemporary discipline does not reflect those earlier contributions. In the mid-20th century, peace research institutes began to arise nationally (Peace Research Institute Oslo - PRIO) and internationally (International Peace Research Association - IPRA) and the ‘discipline’ consolidated academically in the 1970s through a confluence of activism, research and education (Morrison, 2008). In the latter half of the 20th century, female PACS scholars observed that foundational male PACS scholars only focused on international forms of violence (Boulding 2000) while ignoring Gender-Based Violence and Violence Against Women within so-called zones of peace (Brock-Utne 1985). The gendering of PACS by women ‘pracademics’ permitted an important understanding of the role of gender in society, and gender in violence (Leatherman 2011; Noddings, 2012), the role of militarized (Enloe, 2000) and dominant masculinities (Reardon 1996) in violence, the role of gender in armed conflict (Merry 2009) and the importance of gendering peace processes post conflict (Ni Aolain, 2011).

There are many similarities between feminism and peace studies related to engagement both within the field and in the research findings. As Confortini (2013) puts it, ‘the how matters’. In a study of Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), she investigates the appropriate methodological tools for WILPF’s ‘fact-finding’ trips, and argues that “a commitment to ‘dynamic peace’ (which includes the presence of social justice) cannot ignore feminist principles” (p.287). Confortini identifies the importance of attentiveness to all voices, to relationships and power; empathetic listening; an ethics of care; on-going critical reflection; and (self-) reflexivity.

Nevertheless, despite the activism and intellectual contributions from women scholars of PACS, there remain similar issues of gender inequality for academics within the discipline. As a much smaller and less well-resourced and staffed academic division, PACS has not been able yet to undertake the research into its own arena, and does not have the same data about academic women, as does politics. However, as our own experience and anecdotal evidence resonates so much with our colleagues in political studies, we will be engaging in our own research to assess the status of women in the field of Peace and Conflict Studies.

References


Reflections

The Efficacy of Non-Violence in a Post-Truth Age

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In 1963, photos of civil rights protestors being blasted by fire hoses, chased by dogs, and beaten by white supremacists shook the conscience of the United States (Johnson, 2007). The civil rights protestors – dignified, respectful, dressed in Sunday best, and non-violent – were the picture of moral uprightness. The ugliness of white supremacy, on the other hand, was communicated in a variety of ways – and particularly in the violent actions taken against these dignified individuals, especially in the immorality of adults attacking children. This ugliness was made known far and wide, disseminated through national TV and print media that presented the same or similar accounts of the protests and converged on the same narrative framework for these events. Bystanders to the civil rights movement, moved by the stories they read and the images they saw, took the side of the protestors. The groundswell of support for the civil rights protestors was ultimately transformed into national civil rights legislation.

Politics, the great political scientist E.E. Schattschneider argued, is about changing the scope of a conflict in a way that advances your goal (Schattschneider, 1975). By shrouding the side that is utilising it in the cloak of moral uprightness, non-violent protest brings people to the side of those using it. Everyone wants to be on the side of good, and “good” will almost always be identified with non-violence, especially if it is in contrast to a side that clearly uses violence. Civil rights leaders knew this: they planned protests at locations where they knew there would be an overreaction on the part of the white supremacist establishment (McAdam, 1983, 1999). Where, that is, there was a staunch segregationist like “Bull” Connor ready to defend his cause with outrageous means. Such locales were the ideal place to showcase the good of the civil rights cause versus the evil of white supremacy – to produce text and images that would bind the majority of Americans together behind the cause of civil rights.

One of the lessons of this moment in history is that the efficacy of non-violent protests is in part dependent on how those protests are communicated to the wider public that the protestors hope to engage on their side. During the civil rights movement, there was large degree of consensus about what happened in Birmingham, in Selma, in Montgomery. But we face a very different media environment and set of reporting norms today (Williams and Carpini, 2011). While it is most likely naive to say that at least there was widespread agreement about the facts across the media landscape in the civil rights era, if not their interpretation, something has fundamentally shifted regarding the degree to which the accounts of events are contested in this age of “alternative facts.” Hence we speak of the post-truth age (Davies, 2016).

With three now infamous words – “on many sides” (Merica, 2017a) – US President Donald Trump equated the white supremacist, neo-Nazi and other extreme right forces that marched in Charlottesville with the counter-protestors. He then lashed out at those who criticised him for giving succour to violent hate groups by claiming that his condemnation of both sides was based on the true facts of the matter, rather than the false accounts on which his critics relied (Merica, 2017b). In saying that there were “many sides” to blame for the deadly violence in Charlottesville, he effectively suggested that these hate groups and counter-protestors were equally ugly.

This leaves me wondering, and worrying, about what the post-truth landscape means for the efficacy of the strategy of non-violence. Part of the effectiveness of non-violence – and it has been effective (Howes, 2013) – is in its ability to ennable the cause of those who utilise it in a way that makes the cause attractive to outsiders. But this ennobling doesn’t happen if the public disagrees about whether a side – like the counter-protestors in Charlottesville – was really non-violent. When different outlets are broadcasting different facts that make each side look equally condemnable, then non-violence can’t do its alchemical work of transforming hearts and minds.

Of course, this doesn’t mean that there aren’t good reasons – moral and strategic – to privilege the strategy of non-violence. As Mahatma Gandhi recognised, non-violence prevents both the escalation and continued
cycles of violence (Mantena, 2012). It has the potential to transform the hearts and minds of those who directly witness it – including counter-protestors (Mantena, 2012). And practising non-violence means that any mistake is visited on oneself rather than on another (Mantena, 2012). Nevertheless, it's important to recognise how a post-truth landscape may make non-violence a less appealing strategic option – to the detriment of everyone.

References


On the 2nd of August, I woke up in the heart of Bangkok. My roommate and I were full of excitement as we discussed our hopes for the 8th University Scholars Leadership Symposium (USLS) organised by United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific symposium that we were attending, whilst preparing our cultural outfits for the opening ceremony. As we made our way downstairs for breakfast, we saw other delegates, also representing their nations in traditional attire. After breakfast, the hotel foyer was full of bright colours representing different parts of the world, and I felt empowered being in the presence of young and passionate social change makers. After a long journey on the bus through Bangkok traffic, we arrived at the United Nations building. As I made my way into the building, dressed in traditional Māori attire, I felt proud to represent the people of Aotearoa. For the next week, I would meet with 907 university students, representing 78 countries to discuss solutions to some of the most pressing humanitarian issues in the world today. The symposium, jointly run by Humanitarian Affairs Asia and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), focused on the theme of ‘building life, giving hope’. In the week that followed, I saw how coming together to achieve a common goal of social change requires working with and celebrating diversity – of perspectives, people, and practices – every step of the way.

The Symposium spanned issues of social development and environmental protection, interspersing inspirational stories with the details of implementing the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. We heard, for example, from social entrepreneurs, such as Ryan Well, who learnt in Grade One that not everyone had access to clean water and wanted to do something about it. He began by raising money at the age of six for a well and has since founded the Ryan’s Well Foundation, which supports sustainable water and sanitation projects in 16 countries, including Uganda, Kenya and Haiti (Ryan’s Well Foundation, 2017). Representatives from the United Nations Development Programme also educated us on the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that United Nations member countries have agreed to achieve by 2030 (United Nations, 2017). These goals aim to “end poverty, protect the planet and ensure prosperity for all” (United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, 2017, p. 1). I had an opportunity to get a more in-depth understanding of several of these goals throughout the week.

But what I spent the most time on was learning about climate change. I attended a workshop discussion on SDG13 on climate action, facilitated by Rohini Kohli, a development planner in the UNDP’s climate change adaptation team. She works alongside scientists and economists with governments and community-based organisations to come up with a coherent response to climate change in each country (ReliefWeb, 2017). During this workshop, we learnt about the five main targets for SDG13: “(1) ensuring all countries have strong adaptive capacity to respond to climate-related hazards and natural disasters; (2) integrating climate change into national policies, strategies and planning; (3) improving education and raising awareness on climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early warning; (4) implementing the formal commitment of developed countries to jointly contribute USD $100 billion by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries, including meaningful mitigation action; and (5) raising capacities for effective climate change-related planning and management, particularly among marginalised groups, including women and youth” (ReliefWeb, 2017).

In another session, I was part of a group that was asked to discuss SDG1- “End poverty in all its forms everywhere,” and how environmental issues may impact on issues of poverty. We discussed how rising sea levels are leading to people having to leave their homes, especially in island nations. We also talked about how extreme weather conditions are having an impact on small-scale farms, leading to increasing food insecurity. All delegates who attended this workshop had their own experiences in relation to climate action and different interests about the kinds of actions they would like to take. My own plan is to work with another delegate to start an online forum amongst the USLS delegates to map out ways for us to collectively contribute towards climate action.

Prior to attending the conference, my university study of global environmental politics had made me realise that I needed to think more globally. Because I am passionate about lifting Māori communities out of poverty, my focus had initially been mainly local. However, attending this conference, soon after studying environmental
politics, reminded me of my responsibility as a global citizen, as what happens in one part of the world can have an impact elsewhere. The symposium provided a platform for all delegates to share ideas that may help us act on issues of social and environmental justice in each of our respective communities.

On the final day at the UN, I was invited to speak at the closing ceremony of the symposium. I started my speech in Te Reo, which gave me an opportunity to introduce and represent Māori culture on this platform. I had other delegates approach me afterwards wanting to know more about Māori culture, which I feel was a personal achievement at this symposium. Overall, being part of the UN Symposium showed me that such a global network of young people from around the world has the power to act – to change not only ourselves but our society and the environment.

References


Vote, Vote Against the Buying of the Fight

Julie Nevin, Massey University

Please, teach them that values cannot be pre-paid,
That beyond-the-election deserves some forethought
And a promise is not just a game to be played.

Stand up for our world, not the profit brigade,
For all living creatures, lost and distraught,
Stand firm in the sea of job-righteous crusade.

We don’t want a sea that won’t biodegrade,
A nature mutated by all that we’ve bought,
Or poor lives consumed, or love underpaid.

Do more than just hope - stare, unafraid,
At the eye-rolling, back-turning, political sport,
Step into their path, build a hope barricade!

Will any non-fictional heroes invade
The corporate, fossil-fuelled castles we’ve wrought,
Stop them piling up obsolete stuff that we’ve made?

Will we keep acting out the “I’m helpless” charade,
Say we’re too busy, too poor, or somehow fall short,
And we just can’t do anything - nothing but pray?

Will we all hang our heads, or shrug, when blame is laid,
Take spin-dizzy half-truths without second thought,
As they offer our future wellbeing for trade?

Then how will we justify how far we strayed,
To our children, and theirs, all those sad afterthoughts,
Who should know, but maybe don’t, not any more,
That they could have had it all,
instead of
just
what’s
left?
Ownership of renewable energy assets by citizen collectives has been instrumental to the success of German and Danish energy transitions, and has in no small part contributed to today’s competitive prices for solar and wind technology. In Europe, Japan and North-America, research has revealed the size and character of these ‘community renewable energy’ sectors. However, very little is known about local or community energy in New Zealand, its occurrence, shape or its potential role in New Zealand’s energy future.

Over the past two years we have been researching the activities of local and community owned renewable energy projects across the country. As of October 2017, we have identified more than 130 projects spread across New Zealand undertaking a wide range of activities, from building micro-hydro generation to geothermal plants and installing insulation in low-income homes. The local organisations in question range from locally run non-profit associations to large energy consumer trusts, and we also have included municipalities. The results of an earlier analysis of the data have just been published in the Handbook of Energy Transition and Participation (MacArthur, 2017). Now that we have a significantly updated and expanded profile of projects, we are progressing to case studies and interviews for more detailed characterisation and an understanding of the governance landscape in which New Zealand local energy projects navigate.

Internationally community energy is thought to deliver a range of benefits ranging from public support for renewable energy to learning and empowered communities that become adept at channelling project revenues into strategic investment opportunities for local socio-economic development. However, there is a real lack of empirical evidence; the social impacts of these projects in particular are difficult to ‘measure’ empirically and communicate to policy makers. It is as if the vocabulary does not exist, simply because nobody has given these local processes words, let alone establish methods to assess them. Ultimately, on the back of earlier work (MacArthur, 2016; Berka and Creamer, in press), we hope to place local energy in New Zealand firmly in the context of the international literature on impacts, and through country comparative studies, understand how varied forms of community energy have emerged from different domestic governance contexts. New Zealand, we’ve found so far, is relatively unique in the lack of explicit policy frameworks for local and collective power ownership – but why this is needs explaining (Berka, MacArthur and Gonnelli, forthcoming). From 2017 to 2020 the comparative aspects of this research extends the study to the United Kingdom and Denmark as comparative country cases.

References


A neoclassical realist approach to Russian foreign policy and the annexation of Crimea

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My dissertation explores the debate over the Russian Federation’s 2014 annexation of Crimea by considering questions raised in the literature about the importance of systemic constraints and the role of domestic factors in Russian foreign policy. The theoretical foundation reviews liberal, constructivist, and realist branches of international relations (IR) theory, and employs a neoclassical realist framework to explore both Russia’s relative power, as well as Russian domestic regime power. The work investigates systemic pressures, such as eastward advances by the European Union and NATO, and the tumultuous relationship between Moscow and Washington, D.C., particularly their diverging views regarding Kosovo and conflict over the Eastern European colour revolutions. Domestic influences on foreign policy, such as ideology, Putin’s personal outlook, or domestic political pressures are examined both through the work of Western political theorists, such as Michael McFaul, Stephen Sestanovich, and John J. Mearsheimer, as well as by drawing on original Russian-language sources, including presidential proclamations and public opinion research by Russia’s Levada-Center.

The research finds that systemic pressures, particularly NATO expansion and competition over influence in Eastern Europe, are the primary motivating factors behind Russian foreign policy towards countries in Russia’s historical sphere of influence. However, to fully understand the timing of the annexation of Crimea, it is necessary to consider Russian domestic politics and regime power. The use of counterfactuals explores why Russia did not annex Crimea prior to 2014, despite an ongoing vested interest in the peninsula and Moscow’s repeated demands for control over the Black Sea Naval Base at Sevastopol in the decades since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. Through a neoclassical realist interpretation of Russian foreign policy and case study methodology, a clear understanding of the motivation and timing behind Russia’s annexation of Crimea emerges.
A current debate within International Relations theory centers on the global resurgence of religion. Secularisation Theory is out. And Post Secular Theory is in. Globally, religion has not been displaced by modernisation, and progress has not uniformly resulted in the separation of church and state. So religion, it appears, is here to stay. This rise in religion appears to be accompanied by attempted reversals of women’s rights, as evident, for example, in the US, Egypt and Poland recently. Such a link between religion and women’s rights is evident in *The Handmaid’s Tale* written by Margaret Atwood in 1985. This year, Hulu released a TV series based on the novel, and the series spoke to the fears and experiences of many women within the US and the world over.

At the time of writing *The Handmaid’s Tale*, Margaret Atwood was lauded for her ability to produce fiction that spoke to current feminist narratives. With this year’s release of the Hulu TV series, *The Handmaid’s Tale* appears to be more relevant than ever. “In the wake of the recent American election, fears and anxieties proliferate. Basic civil liberties are seen as endangered, along with many of the rights for women won over the past decades, and indeed the past centuries” (Desta, 2017).

*The Handmaid’s Tale* takes us to a fictional US, where a resurgent religion has captured the state and renamed this new theocracy Gilead. Human breeding has become a primary concern of the state, not just as a form of control, but also because infertility, incorrectly assumed to be solely female based, is on the rise. This massive drop in fertility leads to the introduction of restrictive reproductive laws that focus on the repression of women within Gilead. Interestingly, recent research has concluded that male fertility has halved in the last forty years (Davis, 2017). Researchers have pointed to environmental pollution as the most likely culprit (Yang & Hudson, 2016), matching the cause of infertility in Atwood’s Gilead.

Atwood’s rule for writing *The Handmaid’s Tale* was to base everything in it on something that had already happened. This led her to observe that “the control of women and babies has been a feature of every repressive regime on the planet” (Atwood, 2017). She justifies her use of religion as the governing ideology of the Gilead regime, stating that “the book is not ‘anti-religion.’ It is against the use of religion as a front for tyranny; which is a different thing altogether” (Atwood, 2017). Unfortunately, there are plenty of cases where religion has been – and is - the ideological basis for the suppression of rights, and the imposition of autocratic power.

The key point of the book is aptly made in the TV series. Religious theocracies are not kind to women. With the rise of arch Christian Mike Pence to the position of Vice President within President Trump’s administration in the US, concerns over religious restrictions on women’s reproductive choices have heightened. In reaction to funding cuts to Planned Parenthood and the Republicans’ proposed Healthcare Bill, alarmed citizens and activists across the US have donned the red cloak and white peaked bonnets of Gilead’s handmaids, directly referencing men’s dominance over female reproductive power within *The Handmaid’s Tale* (Loughrey, 2017). Along with the pink pussy hats worn during the early protests against Trump’s misogyny and his Presidency, the Handmaid’s uniform has become one of 2017’s symbols of modern American feminist protest.

The TV series contains a scene that is not in the book. Viewers were shocked by the inclusion of a scene in which Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) is performed on a handmaid caught having a lesbian relationship. The ‘Aunt’ tells her that “things will be easier for you now, you won’t want what you can-not have…blessed be the fruit, dear” (Hulu, 2017). FGM has risen in the consciousness of socially-aware women everywhere, with the European Commission expressing concern that migrants may have reintroduced the practice in recent times in Europe, where in the mid-nineteenth century it was recommended as a cure for hysterical mania, epilepsy, sterility and other ‘vices’ (European Commission: Daphne Funding Programme, 2002; Kandela, 1999).
Mona Eltahawy wrote in 2012 that women’s rights were so dismal in the Middle East, that the only explanation is that their men do not like them, a view she explained in her article, “Why do they hate us?” (Eltahawy, 2012). Take Egypt, a religious and conservative country, where an estimated 91% of married women have been subject to genital mutilation (Kingsley, 2015), and where despite claims that conservative dress protects women from the ‘unrestrainable’ sexual appetites of men, 99.3% of Egyptian women report suffering sexual harassment (Dabh, 2013). Women’s dress illustrates a key theme of societal control in Atwood’s novel, reflected in the visuals of The Handmaid’s Tale. The costume designer sneaked an inverted vagina into the collar design of the Handmaids’ controllers, the Aunts. She picked blood red for the red uniform of the fertile handmaids, so they look like a metaphorical river of menstrual blood as they walk en masse down the street amongst the infertile (Lincoln, 2017).

The imposition of restrictions on women’s reproductive issues is also underway in Poland. Nationwide ‘Black Monday’ mass protests swept the country on Monday 3 October 2016. Warsaw was shut down by striking female workers dressed in black mourning clothes to symbolise the death of choice in protest against proposed laws to increase restrictions on abortion, a move backed by the church. Activists expressed concerns, with Agata Piotrowska stating, “the Catholic church helped the government win the elections. And it is using this legislation, among others, to pay its debt” (Fishwick, 2016). However, in the face of a significant female backlash, the church backed off. Women donate more, and turn up to church in greater numbers than men. Apparently, the faith is amenable to financial and sermon attendance concerns over and above its political stands (BBC, 2016; Kacpura, 2016).

The Handmaid’s Tale introduces discussion points that would be relevant to classes in both Political Science and Women’s Studies. For instance, the series expands beyond the inner world of the main character Offred to subtly explore the frustration of the Commandant’s wife, Serena Joy. Serena Joy, a former televangelist, is secretly miserable. She has been disempowered by her own pre-Gilead aims, the ‘correction’ of women’s rights and the re-domestication of women. She envisioned herself as a religious and political pioneer, an important leader within Gilead. But instead, banned from leadership by gender, she has unintentionally trapped herself into servitude to the values she held dear. The series also provides an interesting look at the possible political repercussions of a continued rise in infertility and the worsening of environmental issues. The series surmises that the uncertainty and fears that these issues could cause may well provide an opening for a political shift away from democracy towards autocratic rule. Additionally, the series highlights the possible outcome of the ever widening gap between liberals and conservatives - that in the end extreme conservatives, frustrated at the loss of male and religious power, could reject democracy in favour of a political system that reflects their own world view.

1. Secularisation Theory assumed that as States modernised, religion would decline. This would be accompanied by a separation of ‘church and state’ (Casanova, 2006).

2. Post Secular Theory refutes Secularisation Theory on the basis that Secularisation Theory was crafted through assumptions made in relation to the European example. Post Secular Theory asserts that religion has continued to exist despite modernisation, and that religious communities continue to be found even within secularised societies. It also identifies that in many areas of the world, particularly within Sub-Saharan Africa, religion has resurfaced as globalisation has advanced (Habermas, 2008, pp. 18-21).

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Mike Mills’s *20th Century Women* isn’t a film about feminism. It’s a coming of age story largely revolving around the players involved in 15-year-old Jamie Fields’ (Lucas Jade Zumann) journey to adulthood. And yet, it does alight on some distinctly feminist ideals of the past century, such as challenging patriarchy and sexual liberation. Inspired by Mills’s own childhood, the film is set in a 1979 Santa Barbara, California boarding house and is told through a series of deftly curated vignettes from a young boy’s perspective. Annette Bening plays Dorothea Fields, Jamie’s free-thinking mother who is devoted to raising her son in the chaos of the seemingly endless renovations to her glorious but dilapidated house. “I don’t think you need a man to raise a man,” she ponders, signalling the film’s premise of how a whole household can contribute to a child’s upbringing.

In part due to the 40-year age gap, Dorothea laments the burgeoning cultural rift between her and her son, and so she enlists the help of two members of Jamie’s de facto family, who form the other titular characters. “Mum’s from the Depression,” Jamie says as he frequently tries to explain Dorothea’s desire for a communal style parenting, often accompanied with an exasperated eye roll. One of these ostensible surrogate mothers is Abbie (Greta Gerwig), an aspiring photographer and cancer survivor who boards in the rambling house over which Dorothea presides. Needless to say, with her striking red haircut and embodiment of American punk, Abbie’s influence is far from the quintessential maternal touch. She takes Jamie on tours of night clubs and supplies him with feminist classics of the 1970s like *Our Bodies, Ourselves* and *Sisterhood is Powerful*. The other equally unlikely recruit is Jamie’s closest friend Julie (Elle Fanning), a promiscuous and sullen teenaged rebel whom Jamie pines for, though their relationship remains strictly platonic. As an audience, we develop an appreciation of the connection these three women have with Jamie as they undergo voyages of their own self-discovery.

Somewhat paradoxically, given that this film is set in the socially liberal context of the 1970s, I am struck by the realisation that it would score remarkably low on the Bechdel test. This venerated yardstick of gender representation requires a film to contain at least two female characters who discuss something other than a man (Bechdel, 1986). But while Jamie is regularly the topic of conversation for all three of the main female characters, the film could hardly be deemed as sexist. Feminism, in this respect, concerns more than mere subject matter. Here, the story is just as much about women who are grappling with their own uncertainties and anxieties. Their dialogue isn’t centred around being saved by any proverbial Prince Charming but, quite the contrary, it’s about how they can help this one boy.

We see how feminism can encompass a range of conflicting views in the character of Dorothea, who sometimes appears to be at ideological odds with the feminist zeitgeist she symbolises. Though we view her as the archetypal independent liberal feminist, she still harbours reservations about the movement’s frankness, as demonstrated by her frustration with Abbie, whose full-blown emphasis on explicit sexual politics represents perhaps a more progressive generation.

I think this intergenerational dimension touches on the almost disillusioning incrementalism of feminism. Mills provides the audience a poignant snapshot of three different women’s lives and at the same time exposes us to a discontent that paved the way for Ronald Reagan’s tumultuous and conservative administration. Such discontent draws eerie parallels with today’s political climate in which protection, and even establishment, of women’s rights is still an arduous battle around the world. We are reminded that some struggles - be they of feminist movements or of feminists seeking to be good parents - are on-going and unlikely to have nice, easy resolutions.

So does Mills add something new to current feminist conversations? I don’t think so. Though nor do I think he has to. Certainly, films can be brilliant devices for making grand political statements but what those like *20th Century Women* do best is storytelling. By highlighting the human side to politics, Mills exemplifies how films play an important role in the construction of meaning, and arguably, this is the foundation for any kind of activism. In this sense, the film may not be well suited to university courses that wish to more deeply explore the complexities of political and feminist theory. But, then again, this was never a film about feminism.

References

Recent Publications


Vicki A. Spencer, University of Otago

My latest book, *Toleration in Comparative Perspective* (Lexington Books, 2017), is an edited collection that explores conceptions of toleration and tolerance in Asia and the West. Thirteen scholars from New Zealand, Japan, Hong Kong, Australia and the United States test the common assumption in Western political discourse and contemporary political theory that toleration is a uniquely Western virtue. Toleration in Western philosophy is understood as principled noninterference in the practices and beliefs of others that one disapproves of or, at least, dislikes. This book begins by exploring the lineage of this idea in the West, but it shows, too, that it is not the only conception evident in the Western tradition. Although toleration might be seen today as a quintessential liberal value, precedents to this modern concept existed in medieval times while Native American stories about welcome challenge the very possibility of noninterference.

The Western philosophical concept of toleration is not always easily translated into other philosophical traditions, but this book opens a dialogue between various traditions of thought to explore precisely the ways in which overlap and distinctions exist. What emerges is the existence of a family of resemblances in approaches to religious and cultural diversity from a programme of pragmatic noninterference in the Ottoman Empire to deeper notions of acceptance and inclusiveness amongst the Newar People in Kathmandu Valley. The development of an Islamic ethic of tolerance, the Daoist idea of all-inclusiveness, and Confucian ideas of broad-mindedness, respect and coexistence to the idea of ‘the one in the many’ in Hindu thought are examined along with sources for intolerance and tolerance in Pali Buddhism, early modern Japan and contemporary India. While the Western idea of toleration might not exist in precisely the same form in other traditions, we show that many philosophical traditions possess comparable ideas and practices.
What is journalism today? The old definitions of journalism are under fire; its occupational identity and importance to democracy, public life, and social justice are contested; the content, technologies, practices and cultural conditions of production of news are changing. Contemporary developments signal significant shifts in the ways journalism is practised, conceptualised and taught. This book, written in the context of the World Journalism Education Congress (WJEC) held in 2016 at Auckland University of Technology, New Zealand, offers a collection of essays on some of the key concepts, categories and models that have underpinned WJEC discussions about journalism research and pedagogy.

The overall theme of the Congress – integrity and the identity of journalism and journalism education across the globe – generated rigorous debate about journalism studies and the distinctiveness, subject matter, and journalism curriculum today. It was an excellent catalyst for rethinking journalism, and its ability to move the boundaries of civic discourse. The book maps the advantages and limits of exploring journalism in the light of key ideas that underpin its contemporary practice: citizenry (Geoff Crag), ethics (Donald Matheson), detachment (Verica Rupar), transparency (Greg Treadwell), news consumption (Holly Cowart and Kim Walsh-Chandlers), metrics (Merja Myllylahti), innovation (Nico Drok), professionalism (Katherine Reed) and imagination (Steve Reese). Each essay offers an informed perspective on the topic’s conceptual foundation, current debates and its importance for understanding 21st century journalism, examining its intellectual authority, place in society, norms that rule its practice, and pressures it faces in slicing the world into “all the news that’s fit to print.” The book aims to open the discussion by placing ideas about the work of journalism – producing, reproducing and naturalising collective conceptions of reality – in a wider and deeper context of political, social, and occupational change.
Straddling disciplines and continents, Feminist Futures interweaves scholarship and social activism to explore the evolving position of women in the Global South. Working at the intersection of cultural studies, critical development studies, and feminist theory, the book’s contributors articulate a radical and innovative framework for understanding the linkages between women, culture, and development, applying it to issues ranging from sexuality and the gendered body to the environment, technology, and the cultural politics of representation.

One goal of our women, culture and development approach is to ensure that political economy is not defined as a domain that is privileged above that of culture, but that culture is seen as operating simultaneously with political economy. Thus, contributors analyse the complex ways in which culture – in all of its myriad forms – both shapes and is shaped by the term ‘woman’, and also examine how culture is created by women across the Third World. The volume interrogates the way in which the use of culture(s) permits the expression of alternative, sustainable and empowering forms of development – a term we define as ‘well-being’ and creativity in all domains of life. In this way, the book emphasises the specific links amongst women, culture, and development so that our interdisciplinary work creates a new framework that both alters the intellectual identities of each element and creates a linkage amongst areas routinely defined as rather distant from each other.

This revised and updated edition brings together leading academics, as well as a new generation of activists and scholars, to provide a fresh perspective on the ways in which women in the South are transforming our understanding of development.